Chapter Fifteen

Pickett’s Mill

 

                On May 22, Johnston, then at Altoona, sent Wheeler’s Cavalry to the rear of the army in order to observe the enemy’s movements. The cavalry reported that it appeared Sherman was moving in a westerly direction as if to cross the Etowah River. On the 24, Wheeler defeated a Federal detachment guarding a supply train near Cassville. He carried off 182 prisoners, 70 loaded wagons, and 300 equipped horses and mules. Meanwhile, cavalry general W.H. Jackson sighted the Federals as they crossed the river east of Kingston near Stilesboro’. Johnston shifted his forces accordingly so as to block the flank movement by establishing a new line of battle at with Hardee on the left, near Dallas, Polk in the center, and Hood on the right, near New Hope Church.

                On the 25, Sherman’s lead column, Hooker’s Corps, fought against the line of A.P. Stewart’s Division of Hood’s Corps. Although only partially covered by entrenchments, Stewart’s Division held firm against every assault. “As the advancing line would break,” wrote B. L. Ridley “we could only greet their departure with a yell before another line would come.” After three hours of futile charges, Hooker withdrew from the field of battle, now covered by bluecoats. “The mortality from our view was frightful”, wrote a Confederate private. Hooker estimated his losses to be 1,665 killed and wounded. (1)

                The next morning, it was discovered that the Federals were extending their line to the east. “These lines”, wrote a Federal general “were found subsequently at different points to be within 100 yards of the enemy's entrenchments, hence the firing of skirmishers, or from main line to main line, was constant and cost us many men”. Despite the heavy losses from the Battle of New Hope Church, Sherman refused to believe that he was facing Johnston’s entire line; at most, he suspected the enemy in his front was a single corps. He devised a simultaneous plan of assault where General McPherson would join up with Hooker’s Corps in a diversionary attack against the Confederate left while General Howard‘s IV Corps, with parts of the XIV and XXIV Corps would slip around the Confederate right. (2) 

                Oliver Otis Howard, a native of Maine, had seen his share of battle. Loosing an arm at the battle of Seven Pines, Howard was routed from the field at Chancellorsville by Stonewall Jackson’s flanking maneuver and had since been dubbed “Uh-Oh Howard” by his troops. Sherman seemed to dislike the pious Howard, whom he said, “ought to have been born in petticoats.” Marching through an almost impenetrable maze of forest to his destination, Howard stopped long enough to scribble a message to General Thomas:

 

I am on the ridge beyond the field that we were looking at this morning. No person can appreciate the difficulty in moving over this ground unless he can see it. I am on the east side of the creek on which [Pickett's] Mill is, facing south, and am now turning the enemy's right flank, I think. A prisoner reports two divisions in front of us, Cleburne's and Hindman's.

 

After delivering the dispatch to Thomas, the courier rode back through the humid Georgia afternoon to Howard’s headquarters. “General Thomas says that Major General Sherman wishes us to get on the enemy's flank and rear as soon as possible.” With these words, Howard deployed his men for battle. The die was cast. (3)     

 

 

                Johnston had fought long enough with Sherman to anticipate such a move. Unknown to Sherman, the general had already sent reinforcements, Cleburne’s Division, to the extreme right of the line as early as the 26. By the time Howard was rushing his men through the woods, and inevitably getting lost, Cleburne was tweaking his positions for maximum effectiveness. After consulting with Hindman, Cleburne learned that although the particulars were unknown, it was believed that a large Federal force was moving in their direction. Placing Polk’s Brigade and a regiment of Govan’s Brigade to Hindman’s right to act as lookout, Cleburne placed the remainder of his division as support behind Hindman. To the immediate right of Hindman, he anchored the line with Hotchkiss’ Artillery of 12 guns. Partial barricades were built that night with rifle pits supporting them of either end. The thick underbrush in their front was left in tact; although accuracy would be hindered, cover was deemed more important. Before the troops slept on their arms, Cleburne had paths cut from position to position so the troops could be shuttled into place.

                As the sun rose the next morning and no attack came, Cleburne became increasingly worried. Should the Federals pass to his right, there was nothing to stop him from marching to Atlanta but Wheeler’s Cavalry. Sending Govan’s Brigade on a reconnaissance to the northeast, Cleburne expected they would soon run into the Federals. Govan reported that the enemy was massing in large numbers and moving by the Confederate’s right. Cleburne immediately recalled Govan and placed him to the right of Polk. At 4pm, Granbury’s scouts reported that the enemy “would flank us before night if we did not stop them in some way”. Bringing Granbury’s Texans from reserve behind Hindman to the right of Govan, Cleburne’s Division was now on the front—a thin grey line between the enemy and Atlanta. (4) 

 

 

                Even before Howard had received the definite orders to attack from Thomas, he had planed the layout of the attack. Hoping to catch the Confederates on the flank, he deployed two of his divisions, Wood’s and Johnson’s, parallel to each other with both of their three brigades placed one right after the other. The result was an attack force two brigades across and three brigades deep. 

Peering through his field glasses just before 4:30 in the afternoon, Howard saw the end of Govan’s line and feeling that it was the end of the Confederate line, directed Hazen’s Bridge of Wood’s Division to move forward. Although both Wood and Johnson were in position to attack, Howard sent forward just 1/3 of Wood’s entire force. Turning to Wood, Howard said, “We will put in Hazen, and see what success he has.” Shortly after Hazen began, an aide near Howard was shot off his horse by the bullet of a Confederate sharpshooter. Unknown to Howard, Granbury was passing by the rear of Govan’s line and placing his men on a high ridge to Govan’s left and consequently in Hazen’s path. (5)

General William B. Hazen’s Brigade of 1,500 men, placed in double lines, found it difficult to keep formation as they marched through the thick underbrush. Worse, Hotchkiss’ Artillery, posted on Govan’s left, detected Hazen’s movements and opened fire on his close ranks, inflicting heavy casualties.  Hazen was always a man the Federals could rely on in a tough situation; a West Pointer, Hazen had held the Round Forest, a key defensive position at Murfreesboro. His topographical engineer recalled that he was a “born fighter, an educated soldier, after the war Chief Signal Officer of the Army and now long dead, was the best hated man that I ever knew, and his memory is a terror to every unworthy soul in the service.” (6)

As his two lines moved through the thick underbrush, the rear line lost sight of the front line and began to swerve dangerously towards the east. Hazen did not detect this error and the front line continued their advance unaided. Just as Granbury’s Texans got into position, scouts from Govan’s Brigade came rushing back to the protection of their works, yelling that the Yankees were coming.

Cleburne could not have picked a better position to fight a defensive battle. Although Govan’s works were sparse and Granbury had but rocks and trees for cover, the natural features were decisively in the Irishman’s favor. In Govan’s front was a 30-foot-deep circular sinkhole covered by trees and thick underbrush. As Howard’s discounted cavalry came within range of Govan’s line, they halted and took cover behind their backpacks, which they threw, down to the ground. To their left, Hazen’s front line, composed of four Ohio regiments, met an even greater obstacle: a deep ravine, running roughly perpendicular to Pickett’s Mill Creek, rose into a high ridge along which Granbury’s Texans stood their ground. Cleburne wrote:

 

Here was the brunt of the battle, the enemy advancing along this front in numerous and constantly re-enforced lines. His men displayed a courage worthy of an honorable cause, pressing in steady throngs within a few paces of our men, frequently exclaiming, “Ah! D--- you, we have caught you without your logs now.” Granbury's men, needing no logs, were awaiting them, and throughout awaited them with calm determination, and as they appeared upon the slope slaughtered them with deliberate aim. The piles of his dead on this front, pronounced by the officers in this army who have seen most service to be greater than they had ever seen before, were a silent but sufficient eulogy upon Granbury and his noble Texans.

 

For 20 minutes, the firing was kept up. Govan, after pushing the dismounted cavalry back, shifted his line and opened upon Hazen’s left. In desperation, some of Hazen’s men rushed through the sinkhole only to be cut down a few paces from Govan’s line. Above the din of the firing, Granbury’s voice could be distinctly heard shouting orders to his men. Cleburne ordered a detachment from Hotchkiss’ Artillery, Key’s howitzers, to be brought from Govan’s left and placed in a “convenient breach” between Govan and Granbury to enfilade the enemy in the Texan’s front. (7)

Meanwhile, Hazen’s second line, composed of the 5th, 6th, and 23rd Kentucky and the 6th Indiana Regiments had pushed back General John H. Kelly’s cavalry posted along Pickett’s Mill Creek and were passing to the right of Granbury’s line. Granbury sent an urgent call for reinforcements from Govan, who was largely unoccupied at this time. Just as Hazen’s second line was entering a wheat field some 50 yards in Granbury’s rear, the 8th and 19th Arkansas Regiments, commanded by Colonel Baucum, charged down the ridge, crashing into Hazen’s flank, and “with irresistible impetuosity forced him across the field and back into the woods, from which he had at first advanced”. But the Federals were not done yet. Reforming, the line pushed across the wheat field towards the Baucum’s outnumbered Arkansans. Riding down the line, Cleburne met Lowrey’s Bridge en route for the endangered flank. “Secure Granbury’s right!” Cleburne yelled. Upon arriving, Lowrey saw that he would not have time to form a line: the enemy was steadily advancing across the wheat field, enveloping Baucum’s flanks. Lowrey’s men pushed forward, firing into the attacker’s flanks as they deployed. “Indeed” wrote Lowrey, “it was one of those times in which the victory trembled in the scale, and the lives of many men, and probable the destiny of an army, hung upon a moment of time”. Cleburne noted:

 

My thanks are…due to General Lowrey for the coolness and skill which he exhibited in forming his line. His successive formation was the precise answer to the enemy's movement in extending his left to turn our right. Time was of the essence of things, and his movement was the quickest. His line was formed under heavy fire, on ground unknown to him and of the most difficult character, and the stern firmness with which he and his men and Baucum's regiment drove off the enemy and resisted his renewed attacks without doubt saved the right of the army, as Granbury had already done.

 

By 5:45, Hazen’s shattered brigade in front of Granbury and Lowrey were limping to the rear. Already, a fresh brigade of Federals, commanded by Gibson, was marching past their routed comrades towards the deadly ravine. (8)          

                Like Hazen, Gibson’s Brigade was subjected to enfilading fire from Key’s Howitzers as it neared the ravine. Charging down into the ravine, the two lines were met head-on by the Texan’s musketry. At the bottom, where blood ran like water down to Pickett’s Mill Creek, the lines reformed and renewed their assault up the ridge. At the top, the ‘survivors’ were clubbed back down into the ravine, bayoneted, or taken prisoner. About this time, Granbury was wounded and Colonel R. Q. Mills took command.

                As darkness fell, another brigade was put in: Knefler’s. Private William Oliphants, of the 6th/15th Texas recalled:

 

In the last charge an Indiana regiment came up in front of my regiment in splendid style. Although we poured into them a deadly fire they closed gaps in their line and pressed steadily forward, until they were almost upon us, but they could not stand our terrible fire. When but a few feet from the points of our bayonets they seemed to wither away and those not killed or wounded were forced to fall back. The color bearer of the regiment fell with his flag, instantly another seized the flag and held it aloft only to fall dead, again and again it was raised only to fall again, until six brave men yielded up their lives in trying to keep it flying. The sixth man fell with the flag in front of our company and only about twelve feet from us. There it lay, a prize within our grasp. I could have reached it with a single bound, but thought as it was already ours I would wait until their line had been fully driven back before picking it up. When that Indiana regiment broke and fell back—leaving the flag on the ground at our feet one of the Federals turned and seeing it was being left behind threw down his gun, came back and picked it up. He straightened himself to his full height, gritted his teeth and flapped his flag in our faces. Instantly a half dozen rifled were leveled on him and in another moment he too would have fallen pierced with bullets, but just then one of our boys cried out, “don’t shoot him, he’s too brave.” We lowered our rifles and gave him a cheer as he carried his flag safely away.  

 

As Knefler’ Brigade withdrew, darkness fell and firing became sporadic. Cleburne knew that if Knefler’s assault was renewed with any of Howard’s many reserves, his thinned and weary line could collapse. Therefore, when Granbury, despite his wounds, asked to assault the demoralized Federals in his front, Cleburne readily agreed. Lieutenant Collins recalled, “The order came down the line from mouth to ear, ‘Fix bayonets’. In an instant a thousand bayonets gleamed in the twilight, and every man seemed determined to hold this line or give up his life in the effort.” Captain Sam Foster recalled:

 

The bugle sounded the charge, and we raised a regular Texas Yell, or an Indian Yell or perhaps both together, and started forward through the brush, and so dark we could not see anything at all. W commenced to fire as soon as we started, and the Yanks turned loose, and the flash of their guns would light up the woods like a flash of lightning, and by it we could see a line of blue coats just there in front of us, but the noise we made with our mouths were too much for them.  

 

“It needed but the brilliancy of this night attack to add luster to the achievements of Granbury and his brigade in the afternoon,” wrote Cleburne. That night, as Confederate artillery shells whizzed through the darkness, the Federals hastily constructed earthworks south of the mill. One shell exploded near Howard. Feeling pain in his foot, Howard covered his eyes with an armless sleeve and shouted, “I am afraid to look down!” In reality, the shell had only torn the heel off his boot. (9)

               

 

                “When the sun had chased the shades of night away beyond the [Smoky] Mountains, it revealed a scene on that hillside that was sickening to look upon,” recalled Lieutenant Collins. “All along in front of the center and left of our brigade the ground was literally covered with dead men. To look upon this and then the beautiful wildwoods, the pretty flowers as they drank in the morning dew, and listen to the sweet notes of the songsters in God’s first temples, we were constrained to say, ‘What is man and his destiny, what a strange thing is the problem of life’. We dug two pits and in them disposed the mortal remains of about five hundred men.” Foster himself, although a battle-hardened veteran, was forced to retire from the field to keep from fainting at the horrible sight. “it don’t seem so funny now as it was when it was going on”, he wrote. Cleburne concluded, “My casualties in this battle were few. I had 85 killed, 363 wounded, carrying into the engagement 4,683 muskets. The enemy's losses were very heavy. The lowest estimate which can be made of his dead is 500. We captured 160 prisoners, who were sent to army headquarters, exclusive of 72 of his wounded carried to my field hospital. He could not have lost in all less than 3,000 killed and wounded. I took upward of 1,200 small-arms. This battle was fought at a place known as the "Pickett Settlement," and about two miles northeast of New Hope Church.” (10) 

               
    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

               

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sources

 

  1: The Battle of New Hope Church by B. L. Ridley: Confederate Veteran

  2: Oliver O. Howard’s Report of operations from May 1 to September 8, 1864: O.R. Series XXXVIII part 1

  3: Along the Deadline: article found at www.ehistory.com/uscw/features/Articles/0006/picketts.cfm   

    : Ibid

    : 89th Illinois: article found at www.brotherswar.org/pickett.htm

  4: Stonewall of the West: chapter 11 page 212 

  5: 89th Illinois

  6: Along the Deadline

  7: Cleburne’s report of the Battle of Pickett’s Mill

    : Ibid

  8: Cleburne’s report

    : Stonewall of the West: chapter 11 page 213

    : A Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 9 page 225

    : Cleburne’s report

  9: A Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 9 page 224

    : Lone Star General: page 80

    : One of Cleburne’s Command: chapter 3 page 85

    : Cleburne’s report

    : A Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 9 page 229

10: Lone Star General: page 80

    : One of Cleburne’s Command: chapter 3 page 88

    : Cleburne’s report